When Malcolm Stewart told our eighth grade class that “the joy is in the striving,” which he did almost weekly, he did so both as our English teacher and as our cross-country coach. A tall, lanky, mop-headed recent college graduate who wore his shirtsleeves rolled up to mid-bicep and perpetually had small deposits of drying spittle in the corners of his mouth, Malcolm was one of the smartest and most intense men who ever taught me anything about either reading or running. He was also about the most tirelessly honest man I’ve ever known. It was no surprise to me that he left school the year our class graduated to attend Yale’s law program, or that he then rose through the ranks to become the second-highest defense attorney in the country, as our Deputy Solicitor General.
Malcolm (he was also the first teacher who allowed us to call him by his first name) wanted us to pay attention. Whether running or reading, he wanted us to be aware of, and to celebrate, the act itself. The striving. He was, interestingly, not noticeably happier when we won a cross-country meet than when we lost one. He was interested in the turns of phrase more than the morals of the story; more interested in the coordination of breath, arm swing, and leg pump than mile splits.
So it didn’t seem out of character—although it did amuse the hell out of me—when he argued, last year, in front of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the federal government, under the rules of campaign finance imposed by the McCain-Feingold Act, could legally prohibit corporations from funding political speech in book form.
The argument caused at least one SCOTUS commentator (Dahlia Lithwich at Slate) to moan, “Oh, Malcolm Stewart. Malcolm Stewart. With your Macbeth-y first name and your Macbeth-ier last name. You did not just say the government might engage in a teensy little bit of judicious, narrowly tailored book-banning, did you?”
Searching for a way to allow Malcolm off the hook, I developed a theory that the Obama administration didn’t like McCain-Feingold, and that having Malcolm argue the case at hand (the banning of the hateful anti-Hillary Clinton “documentary” Hillary: The Movie in the run-up to the 2008 Democratic primary) to its logical extreme of book-banning was a way to get the act reversed.
But there’s another theory twisting around my brain, the theory that the joy, for Malcolm, is truly in the striving, and that the act of exploring an argument logically was far more interesting than the explosive, four-column-headline outcome ten months later. He is, of course, right—if you want to ban hateful corporate electioneering you have to ban all corporate electioneering—but anyone more interested in the ribbon at the finish line (Exxon can now fully fund any political race they want to) than the race itself is missing his point.

I know that she’s only been First Lady, a presidential candidate, and the Secretary of State, but it’s probably now time to learn that her name is Hillary Clinton, 2 L’s.
typical liberal Democratic approach…loves the process, doesn’t care about winning, and loses.
Great!
“A tall, lanky, mop-headed recent college graduate who wore his shirtsleeves rolled up to mid-bicep and perpetually had small deposits of drying spittle in the corners of his mouth,…”
This is like a passage from a bad novel. What the hell is “mop-headed” and who cares about drying spittle? Why do bad writers feel they need to tell us this crap?
Forget Exxon – China’s sovereign wealth fund and the corporations it owns can now fund attack ads against US politicians that dare confront them.
Way to sell America out, activist Justices!
So is Ted Olson a good guy or a bad guy now? It’s hard to keep track…
@5 – yes.
I was curious if anyone who read the opinion thought of the comment on pg 51 of the potential for it to affect the Washington State name disclosure case. The court talked about disclosure and how facially disclosure of people who paid for ads would be warranted, however they then went further and said:
the Court acknowledged that as-applied challenges would be available if a group could show a “‘reasonable probability’” that disclosure of its contributors’ names “‘will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.’” Id., at 198 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 74)
That seems to me that if these same people decide on the Ref 71 case about name disclosure they may rule that the names should not be revealed.
Is Matthew Richter now to be a regular commenter on SLOG?