Colombia, Venezuela, and the United States are playing diplomatic games with each other over the arrest of Walid Makled, the Lebanese-born Venezuelan national who has suddenly been dubbed the first major South American cocaine “kingpin” since the fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels. (That is, the first independent, business-is-business kingpin—I’m not counting Colombia’s paramilitaries and the FARC.)
Makled was indicted in Manhattan and the U.S. wanted him extradited here. Venezuela, leveraging some of its ability to either shield or flush out FARC warriors in its territory, wants Makled extradited to them. Colombia, where Makled was arrested, just decided to spurn the U.S. and go with Venezuela.
The Makled family is very powerful in Venezuela—and Walid can allegedly can name names of high-ranking Venezuelan officials (from Hugo Chavez to the anti-drug czar, and on down the list) who helped him with his cocaine smuggling. No wonder both the U.S. and Venezuela were jockeying for him.
And Venezuela, with its not-entirely-independent judiciary, got him.
According to news reports, Venezuela has been shuttering FARC bases on their side of the Colombian border and flushing the revolutionaries back into Colombia where they’re more vulnerable—the U.S. can spray poison all over the Colombian countryside, but Venezuela is helping them (or, at least, not hindering as much) in their guerrilla war. It shouldn’t be surprising that Venezuela got Makled.
But I’m mostly interested in how this might re-frame the levamisole mystery: Since I began this whole cocaine odyssey, I’ve been troubled by a core question: If the cocaine-production market in Colombia is so fractured (as academics and law-enforcement and other experts insist it has been since the fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels), why is 70 percent of the cocaine in the U.S. cut with levamisole, a very odd (and not all that inexpensive) adulterant?
It just never made sense to me. The experts (from Seattle to D.C.) insisted that a fractured market of thousands of producers could independently come to the same conclusion and use the same cut because of a) some market efficiency promoted by levamisole that we didn’t yet understand or b) some superabundance of levamisole just sitting around Colombia that producers cut into their product out of convenience.
But b) has been disproven by new DEA intelligence showing that cocaine producers in Colombia are working their asses off to keep their levamisole supplies. (More about that here.) And theory a) could be true… but nobody has been able to figure out what levamisole’s great market efficiency/advantage is.
Which leads us to a c), a third possibility. And that is that the experts are mistaken—that cocaine production isn’t as fractured as they think. That there is a central intelligence behind Colombian cocaine production and that central intelligence is the reason for levamisole.*
That central intelligence could be Makled and his people. We’ll see. Or not. Depending on how the trials in Venezuela go.
Makled is also wanted for plotting the murder of Venezuelan journalist Orel Sambrano, who reported extensively on the cocaine trade.
* One shred of evidence pointing towards the c) hypothesis: the DEA used to be able to tell where coca paste was turned into HCl powder based on the technology used. There used to be a Colombian Method, a Peruvian Method (which involves acetone), and a Bolivian Method (which involves ether and acetone). But the DEA is losing their ability to distinguish. In 2008, Colombians were arrested turning paste into powder in Bolivia and it seems South American producers have engaged in international “technology transfers,” blurring the distinctions between their respective methods. From a DEA report: “Distinguishing the processing origin of cocaine HCl is no longer possible based on the solvent profile of a seized cocaine HCl exhibit… It should be noted that the type of HCl conversion process has no effect on the ‘base origin’ determination of cocaine.”
In plainer words, the DEA can still tell where the cocaine was grown and turned into paste. But it can no longer tell where the paste was turned into powder. If the market is so fractured, who organized this transnational technology transfer?

At many different stores can you buy a PC?
And how many different operating systems can you choose from?
Yeah, you got that right…
@ 2. I don’t think so… we’re talking about a trade that’s supposed to be severely separated out over the mountains and jungles of the better part of a continent. And levamisole isn’t that cheap (relatively speaking). And DEA intel shows that producers are trying hard to keep their access, from getting shipments from China to possibly making it in homegrown labs.
@ 1. Your analogy is terrible. An open, legal market in a first-world country with excellent communication and business-coordination systems vs. a secretive, illegal market spread across five or six developing nations and hidden in some of the remotest wilderness on the planet. Plus all the other mitigating factors (the relative obscurity of levamisole, etc.).
It still seems highly improbable. Possible, yes. But improbable.
All I know is I could really use a bump, right now.
And the end result of this will be….Hugo Chavez taking control of the world’s cocaine trade, if he doesn’t have it already. A true narcostate at last. Paradise.
I wonder if the DEA has any idea what the CIA is doing.
Brendan, you had a low-level source in Colombia, but I wonder if you could find someone in either Colombia or Venezuela who could give you some boots-on-the-ground info…? Might be worth a jaunt down there. It’s not that expensive, and Bogotá is an awesome city. Maybe even some off-the-record conversations with government officials – nothing too dangerous – could yield good info about levamisole.